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Abstract
The wide deployment of deep neural networks, though achieving great success
in many domains, has severe safety and reliability concerns. Existing adversar-
ial attack generation and automatic verification techniques cannot formally verify
whether a network is globally robust, i.e., the absence or not of adversarial examples
in the input space. To address this problem, we develop a global robustness verifi-
cation framework with three components: 1) a novel rule-based “back-propagation”
finding which input region is responsible for the class assignment by logic reason-
ing; 2) a new network architecture Sliding Door Network (SDN) enabling feasible
rule-based “back-propagation”; 3) a region-based global robustness verification
(RGRV) approach. Moreover, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on
both synthetic and real datasets.
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have been applied to a variety of domains and achieved great success.
Reliance on DNNs’ decisions makes their behavior reliability of high importance. Recent research
has shown that the safety of DNNs is threatened by their susceptibility to human-imperceptible
adversarial perturbations [14, 4, 1].
To explore the adversarial robustness of neural networks, two aspects have been considered: crafting
adversarial examples and automatic verification. Given an input sample, adversarial example
generation techniques [13, 2, 10, 15, 6] fail to guarantee that no adversarial example exists around
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the given input, when they cannot generate adversarial examples for it. The efforts in automatic
verification mainly focus on the guarantee of local robustness [9, 5, 16, 11, 3], i.e., the robustness of
an input’s neighborhood. These verification approaches can provide a rigorous local robustness proof
if adversarial examples do not exist in a local region. However, the local robustness only takes a
small part of the input space into account, and thus cannot guarantee reliability of the whole network
for every possible input.
Some attempts have been made towards the verification and evaluation of global robustness, i.e.,
finding out whether no adversarial example exists in the input space of a network [12, 6]. Though
the SMT/SAT-based method in [6] takes global robustness into account, the definition for global
robustness in [6] cannot be satisfied by the inputs near the classification boundary. In other words, no
network can satisfy this definition. The technique developed in [12] evaluates the local robustness
of each sample in a test dataset and treats the expected value of evaluation results as the indicator
of “global robustness”. The technique in [12] can be considered as finding expected maximum safe
radius over the test dataset. Thus, the selection of the test dataset directly influences the estimation
in [12], and the global robustness cannot be formally guaranteed in general. We can easily identify
two stumbling blocks on the path of global robustness verification: the complex activation patterns
and large input space. It is computationally prohibited to analyze all possible activation patterns or
traverse input space to guarantee global robustness. Thus existing testing and verification techniques
are infeasible to handle the global robustness verification for DNNs.
In this paper, we develop a feasible global verification framework with three components: 1) a
novel rule-based “back-propagation” which is used for mapping classification rules from output to
input to find which input region is responsible for the corresponding class assignment1, 2) a new
network design Sliding Door Network (SDN) that enables feasible rule-based “back-propagation”,
3) a region-based global robustness verification (RGRV) approach by finding “adversarial regions”.
Particularly, we address the “two stumbling blocks” by two means. Firstly, we design a new activation
function Sliding Door Activation (SDA), with which the number of possible activation patterns is
dramatically reduced to circumvent the complexity issue. Secondly, instead of treating a single input
as the foundation “atom” of global robustness analysis, we cluster the input space into multiple
classification regions to address the input space explosion challenge. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work that can achieve global robustness formally with only slight drop of classification
accuracy compared with classic DNNs. We evaluate the effectiveness of our framework on the
MNIST [8] dataset. We also design a synthetic case study to show the feasibility of our global
verification method.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We introduce the rule-based “back-propagation” in
Section 2. The network design and the corresponding rule-based back-propagation method are
described in Section 3. Section 4 presents the RGRV approach. We evaluate the usefulness of SDN
and effectiveness of RGRV in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes our work.
Figure 1: A DNN with two hidden lay-
ers and one output layer.
Notations. For the convenience of presentation, each tradi-
tional layer Layerh (0 < h ≤ H) is treated as two virtual
layers: pre-activation and activation layer, denoted by L′h and
Lh, respectively. An example is shown in Figure 1, where the
activation layers are L1, L2, L3 and the pre-activation ones are
L′1, L′2, L′3. The i-th neurons in Lh and L′h are denoted as
xhi and x
′h
i , respectively; the weights and the corresponding
biases connecting Lh−1 and L′h are represented as ωhij and b
h
j ;
the activation function of L′h is fh, such as ReLU or softmax.
2 Rule-based back-propagation for DNNs
Due to the colossal input space of DNNs, exhausting all possible inputs with traditional testing
methods is infeasible. Thus we develop a family of classification rules to divide the input space
into several regions. These regions can simplify the global robustness verification significantly. The
1Note that this “back-propagation” is entirely different from typical use of back-propagation for evaluating
the gradient with respect to the weight parameters in DNNs.
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classification rules in the input space could be achieved by the proposed rule-based back-propagation,
as elaborated below. Before introducing the classification rules in detail, we first present a warm up
example.
Example 1. Considering the one-layer network in Figure 2(a), a classification rule in the output
space is (y0 > y1) which represents a blue region in output space shown as Figure 2(b). The back-
propagation we proposed aims for mapping classification rules to the input space. For example, the
activation pattern “all neurons are active” means that (y0 = y′0 ∧ y1 = y′1 ∧ y′0 > 0 ∧ y′1 > 0).
As (y0 = y′0 ∧ y1 = y′1 ∧ y′0 = x1 ∧ y′1 = x0), (y0 > y1) is equivalent to (x1 > x0) and
(y′0 > 0 ∧ y′1 > 0) is equivalent to (x1 > 0 ∧ x0 > 0). Thus the mapping result of output
space (y0 > y1) to input space is (x0 > 0 ∧ x1 > 0 ∧ x1 > x0). If we change the activation
pattern to “y0 is active and y1 is inactive”, the equivalent condition of this activation pattern is
(y0 = y′0 ∧ y1 = 0 ∧ y′0 > 0 ∧ y′1 < 0), because ReLU assigns 0 to y1. Thus (y′0 > 0 ∧ y′1 < 0)
is equivalent to (x1 > 0 ∧ x0 < 0); (y0 > y1) is equivalent to (x1 > 0); the mapping result is
(x0 < 0 ∧ x1 > 0). Obviously, the activation pattern determines the mapping result. The mapping
result (x0 > 0∧ x1 > 0∧ x1 > x0) represents a blue region in input space shown in Figure 2(c). We
name this blue region as classification region, indicating its responsibility to the class assignment.
(a) one-layer network
(b) region of (y0 >
y1)
(c) region of (x0 > 0 ∧
x1 > 0 ∧ x1 > x0)
Figure 2: The one-layer network and regions of
classification rules.
With the intuition from the warm up example, we
now elaborate the rule-based back-propagation layer
by layer for deep neural networks.
There are many inequations recorded as Phγη in
Layerh. These inequations make up the disjunc-
tive normal form ∨γ ∧η Phγη which describes how
neural networks classify the inputs. For simplicity, if
we select a Phγη in Layer
h this Phγη will be denoted
as Ph =
∑
i
cix
h
i + b > 0. We can easily provide
the classification rules in output space. For exam-
ple, “the output belongs to class k” is ∧
j(j 6=k)
yk > yj
where yjs (0 ≤ j < m) are the output values and
m is the number of classes for output. To obtain the
classification rules in input space, we take a typical
DNN2 as an example and propose a back-propagating
function. During the back-propagation from Layerh
to Layerh−1, the Phs should be substituted and the
∧s and ∨s should be retained to Layerh−1, thus we apply our function to each Ph instead of the
conjunctive normal form. The recursive call of this function can back-propagate the classification
rules layer by layer to the input space of the network. Since the output layer and the hidden layers
should be treated in different ways, we divide the function into two parts: the output and hidden layer
part.
The comparison rules like yk > yj can be directly mapped to the corresponding pre-activation layer
based on the order-preserving activation function, e.g., softmax, of the output layer. We replace
every variable yj in inequations with the corresponding polynomial
∑
i ω
H
ij x
H−1
i + b
H
j to obtain the
classification rule in LayerH−1. Thus the output layer part is the function
MAP-OUT(yk > yj) =
∑
i ω
H
ikx
H−1
i + b
H
k >
∑
i ω
H
ij x
H−1
i + b
H
j (1)
and the mapping result of ∧
j(j 6=k)
yk > yj is ∧
j(j 6=k)
MAP-OUT(yk > yj), i.e., the classification rules
in LayerH−1.
The hidden layer part is a function MAP-HIDDEN. Since each linear inequation in Lh can be
simplified into the form
∑
i
cix
h
i + b > 0, we select an inequation P
h =
∑
i
cix
h
i + b > 0 as the input
of MAP-HIDDEN to show how MAP-HIDDEN works. The hidden layers cannot be processed in
the same way as output layer because of the activation patterns which determine the mapping result.
We denote the set of active neurons’ indexes by Θ and use Θ to represent the activation pattern. For
2The activation functions in hidden layers and output layer of this DNN are ReLU and softmax, respectively.
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simplicity, we record the mapping result of Ph under Θh as MAP-FIX(Θh,Ph) where Θh is the
activation pattern of Layerh. MAP-FIX(Θh,Ph) is the conjunction of some classification rules in
Layerh−1.
The function MAP-HIDDEN is shown as follows where ∆h denotes all activation patterns of Layerh:
MAP-HIDDEN(∆h,Ph) = ∨
Θh∈∆h
MAP-FIX(Θh,Ph) (2)
The mapping result of MAP-HIDDEN is the disjunction of all the classification rules in Layerh−1. As
each neuron has two activation states, there are 2m
h
activation patterns in ∆h wheremh is the number
of neurons in Layerh. The time cost of whole back-propagation is O(Πh2m
h
) = O(2
∑
hm
h
). Such
immense time cost makes the above mapping NP-hard and infeasible.
3 Sliding Door Network for Feasible Back-propagation
To handle the complexity issue, we present a novel network design, SDN, and the corresponding
rule-based back-propagation method MSDN . SDN reduces the size of ∆ by grouping the neurons in
each layer to overcome the infeasibility problem in back-propagating classification rules for DNNs.
3.1 Sliding Door Network
Figure 3: Sliding Door Activation. Gh1 and Gh3 are active door and
inactive door respectively and other activation results are the copy
of other groups.
Compared with typical DNNs, SDN
has two different components: a novel
activation function SDA and the loss
function design for supporting SDA.
Sliding Door Activation. SDA takes
a pre-activation layer into account and
divides neurons into several groups
evenly. For example, the layer L′h in
Figure 3 with 10 neurons is divided
into 5 groups which are represented
as Ghj = {x′hi |2j ≤ i < 2j + 2} (0 ≤ j < 5). These groups are classified by SDA into three
categories: active group with all positive neurons (e.g., Gh1 and G
h
4 in Figure 3), inactive group in
which all neurons are negative (e.g., Gh3 in Figure 3), and trivial groups with mixing of both positive
and negative neurons (i.e., Gh0 and G
h
2 in Figure 3).
In order to reduce the complexity, we select the first active (inactive) group as active (inactive) door
for each pre-activation layer. For example in Figure 3, Gh1 and G
h
3 are active door and inactive door
respectively. Based on the assigned doors, we define SDA as:
xhi = SDA(x
′h
i ) =

0 if x′hi belongs to inactive door;
αx′hi if x
′h
i belongs to active door;
x′hi otherwise.
(3)
Figure 4: Architecture of SDN
To increase the network expressiveness, SDA strengthens the active
door by α and assigns 0 to inactive door’s neurons. Other groups
are sent to the corresponding activation layer directly. During the
training, for each pre-activation layer, the position of the two doors
might change instantly up to the states of the groups, behaving like
a sliding door, thus the name of our activation function. Figure 4
shows the entire network architecture, replacing the ReLU in classic
DNNs with the proposed SDA for each layer.
Loss function design. If a pre-activation layer cannot provide ac-
tive or inactive door, the expressiveness of SDN will be weakened.
To avoid this issue, we design regularization term to penalize the
absence of either of the two doors. If the active (inactive) door does
not appear in L′h, we will find the group Ghα (G
h
β) in L
′h with most
4
active (inactive) neurons, and adjust the weights to make the negative
(positive) neurons in Ghα (G
h
β) tend to be positive (negative) so as to create active (inactive) groups.
Thus, besides the typical data fitting loss, we add a regularization term to encourage the emergence
of such groups, defined as:
L(W, b) =
n∑
i=1
(yi − yˆi)2 + λ
∑
h
(
∑
x′hi ∈Ghα,x′hi <0
(−x′hi ) +
∑
x′hi ∈Ghβ ,x′hi >0
x′hi ) (4)
where {W, b} denotes all the weights and biases to be trained, and λ is the user-given penalty
parameter.
3.2 Rule-based Back-propagation for SDN
As MAP-OUT can be reused for the back-propagation of SDN’s output layer, we focus on back-
propagation between hidden layers in this section. The constructing process of MAP-HIDDEN for
SDN is as follows.
We denote the set of neurons in the active door of layer L′h as ΘhA, the set of neurons in the
inactive door as ΘhI , and other neurons are in Θ
h
T . Considering the condition that a rule in L
h is
Ph =
∑
i
cix
h
i + b > 0, and the activation pattern Θ
h is fixed where Θh = {ΘhA,ΘhI ,ΘhT }, we record
the mapping result of Ph under Θh as MAP-FIX(Θh,Ph) with three components:
1) SDNInherit.
SDNInherit =
∑
i∈ΘhA
αci((
∑
t
ωhtix
h−1
t ) + b
h
i ) +
∑
i∈ΘhT
ci((
∑
t
ωhtix
h−1
t ) + b
h
i ) + b > 0, (5)
where we replace the neurons in Ph belonging to ΘhA with the corresponding polynomial, i.e.,∑
t ω
h
tix
h−1
t + b
h
i multiplied by α due to SDA activation, the neurons in Θ
h
T with the corresponding
polynomial meanwhile remove the neurons in ΘhI to obtain SDNInherit.
2) SDNActiveCon.
SDNActiveCon =
∧
i∈ΘhA
((
∑
t
ωhtix
h−1
t ) + b
h−1
i > 0) (6)
It describes the rules that “all the corresponding pre-activation neurons of ΘhA are greater than 0” and
we replace these pre-activation neurons with corresponding polynomial.
3) SDNInactiveCon.
SDNInactiveCon =
∧
i∈ΘhI
((
∑
t
−ωhtixh−1t )− bhi > 0) (7)
It describes the rules that “all the corresponding pre-activation neurons in ΘhI are less than 0” and
we replace these pre-activation neurons with corresponding polynomial. The function MAP-FIX is
shown as follows:
MAP-FIX(Θh,Ph) = SDNInherit ∧ SDNActiveCon ∧ SDNInactiveCon (8)
Taking all the activation patterns into account, we can obtain the function MAP-HIDDEN.
MAP-HIDDEN(∆h,Ph) = ∨
Θh∈∆h
MAP-FIX(Θh,Ph) (9)
The combination of MAP-OUT and MAP-HIDDEN is the complete back-propagating function
MSDN :
MSDN (∆
h,Ph) =
{
MAP-OUT(Ph) h = H
MAP-HIDDEN(∆h,Ph) h < H
(10)
Thus the mapping result of all the rules ∨γ ∧η Phγη in Layerh is ∨γ ∧η MSDN (∆h,Phγη) which is
the collection of rules for Layerh−1. Each |∆h| equals to mh(mh − 1) + 2mh + 1 where mh is the
number of groups in L′h. The SDN has O(Πimi2) activation patterns which is greatly less than the
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number of DNN’s activation patterns O(2
∑
hm
h
) and its rule-based back-propagation becomes more
feasible.
MSDN maps the explicit rules, but ignores the implicit rules. Implicit rules are the constraints from
trivial groups guaranteeing that compared with other active (inactive) groups in Layerh the active
(inactive) door Ghi has the minimal i. For example in Figure 3, the implicit rules are:
∃x′hi ∈Gh0 x
′h
i < 0 ∧ ∃x′hi ∈Gh0 x
′h
i > 0 ∧ ∃x′hi ∈Gh2 x
′h
i > 0
The combination of explicit rules and implicit rules can be organized into the form ∨γ ∧η Phγη.
Each ∧ηPhγη represents a classification region like the blue region in Figure 2(c). Selecting a
Ph =
∑
i
cix
h
i + b > 0 in ∧ηPhγη, a boundary of ∧ηPhγη’s classification region is
∑
i
cix
h
i + b = 0.
We will show that explicit rules is sufficient for global verification in Theorem 1.
4 Region-based Global Robustness Analysis
In this section, we define and address the global robustness verification problem by a region-based
global robustness analysis (RGRA) approach. Firstly, we provide the definition for global robustness:
Definition 1 (Global robustness). Given a network N, if there is no adversarial example in its input
space, N is a globally robust network.
An adversarial example exists in two types of regions: 1) the region which is isolated, 2) the
region which is connected to the correctly classified region. Taking Figure 5 as an example,
it shows a binary classification task where the black dashed line is orale decision boundary of
class C1 and C2 and the orange solid line is the decision boundary determined by network.
Figure 5: Small-size isolated connected
component and protruding region. R1
and R2 are the adversarial regions.
R1 and R2 are adversarial regions. R1 is the small-size isolated
connected component and R2 is the protruding region which
is connected to the correctly classified region. The adversarial
examples belonging to C1 but classified as C2 tend to exist in
R1 and R2. Before presenting the definitions of protruding
region and small-size isolated connected components, we first
present a formal definition of the input space classification
graph.
Definition 2 (Classification graph). Given a result of backward-
mapping in the form of ∨γ ∧ηPhγη , we can build a classification
graph as a tuple (V,E) where
• V = {vi | vi is the ∧η Phγη in ∨γ ∧ηPhγη}. In other words, each classification region can
be defined as a vertex vi.
• E = {(vi, vj) | vi and vj are adjacent vertexes}. Given two vertexes vi and vj , the
corresponding classification regions in the input space are Si and Sj . Two vertexes are
adjacent iff their classification regions are adjacent in high-dimensional space, and formally,
∃x∃ε>0{[∀x′∈ I(x′ ∈ Si ∨ x′ ∈ Sj)] ∧ (I ∩ Si 6= ∅) ∧ (I ∩ Sj 6= ∅)} (11)
where I = {x′| ||x′ − x||∞ < ε}.
Definition 3 (Limiting ball). Given a set of vertexes V ′, the stitching of their regions is S whose
center of gravity is o. The limiting ball B of V ′ can be defined as a ball whose center is o and radius
d = max({dis|dis = ||x− o||∞, x ∈ S}).
With the description of classification graph and limiting ball, we now provide the formal definition of
two types of regions in which adversarial example exist.
Definition 4 (Small-size isolated connected component). Given a connected component S in classifi-
cation graph and aR (R > 0), let B be S’s vertexes’ limiting ball. If B’s radius is smaller thanR,
S is a small-size isolated connected component.
Definition 5 (Protruding regions). Given a vertex v and a r (r > 0), let B be {v}’s limiting ball.
The classification region of v is S. All points with same class as S in B constitute a set Cl(S). The
volume of Cl(S) and B are recorded as vol(Cl(S)) and vol(B) respectively. If S is not a small-size
isolated connected component and vol(Cl(S)) < r × vol(B), S is a protruding region.
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The first step of finding the “adversarial regions” is to construct the adjacency relationship between
vertexes, i.e., building E in classification graph. The construction can be split into two phases: 1)
traverse the vertexes vi in classification graph, and treat vj (j ∈ {t|t > i}) as the potential adjacent
vertexes; 2) find the common boundary shared by vi and vj if they are adjacent, and provide the proof
that they are not adjacent otherwise. Intuitively, a common boundary between vi and vj means that
they stick together on the boundary, formally defined as follows.
Definition 6 (Common boundary). Given two vertexes vi and vj in the classification graph, the
corresponding classification regions are Si and Sj . A boundary F (
∑
cix
0
i + b = 0) which belongs
to vi and vj is defined as a common boundary iff
∃x0∃ε0>0[∀H′ 6=H I ∩H′ = ∅ ∧ ∀x∈I (x ∈ Si ∨ x ∈ Sj) ∧ I ∩ Si 6= ∅ ∧ I ∩ Sj 6= ∅] (12)
where H = {x|∑ cix0i + b = 0} is the set of points on F, H′ is the set of points on other boundaries
F′ of vi and vj , and I = {x| ||x− x0||∞ < ε0}.
As the classification graph is an undirected graph, the first phase only explores the edge (vi, vj)
(j > i) to find the potential adjacent vertex vj . And the following Theorem 1 implies that by
traversing the explicit rules of vi, we can find out all the vj (j ∈ {t|t > i}) which share a common
boundary with vi, i.e., all the adjacent vertexes.
Theorem 1. Given vi and vj(j > i), there is a common boundary belonging to the explicit rules
of vi shared by them iff vi and vj are adjacent.
Proof: see appendix.
Finally, the global robust verification can be achieved by the following steps:
1. Build classification graph. We can obtain the vertexes from the back-propagation result.
Each vertex has some boundaries. For each boundary F of vi, we select some points on it
randomly and sample in the tiny neighborhood of these points. By feeding the samples into
SDN, we can find out their activation patterns. For example, a sample’s activation pattern
represents vj , as this sample is in the tiny neighborhood of points on F, F belongs to vj .
Thus vi and vj shares the boundary F and we add edge (vi, vj) to the edge set E.
2. Find the limiting ball of classification regions and connected components. For a classification
region S, we can obtain the rough upper and lower bound of each dimension. Taking the
inequation
∑
i
cix
0
i + b > 0 as an example, if c1 > 0 and −2 ≤ xi ≤ 2, the lower bound
of x01 is x
0
1 > −((
∑
i(i 6=1∧ci>0)
2ci +
∑
i(i 6=1∧ci<0)
−2ci) + b)/c1. All these bounds form a “box”
including S. We take samples ut (0 ≤ t < n) in this “box" and select the samples in
S. o =
∑
t ut/n is the estimated center. Denote d(ut, o) as the distance between ut
and o, the estimated radius is maxt(d(ut, o)). Moreover, we can calculate the volume of
the “box” vol(box), if there are m samples in S, vol(s) = mn vol(box). If a connected
component consists classification regions Sks, the estimated center is o =
∑
k okvol(Sk)∑
k vol(Sk)
and
maxt,k(d(ukt, o)) is the estimating radius where ukts are the samples in Sk.
3. Find small-size isolated connected components and protruding regions. Given a connected
component, by comparing the radius of limiting ball with theR given by user, we can find
out whether a connected component is a small-size isolated connected component. For a
classification region belonging to class C, we take n samples in the limiting ball. If m of
them belong to C, calculate n/m and compare it with the user given r. Then we can find
out whether this region is a protruding region.
5 Experiments
The evaluation of our work concentrates on three aspects: 1) the utility of SDN on classification
tasks, 2) generating adversarial examples, 3) the feasibility of global verification. In the first part, we
evaluate our method on MNIST database with typical DNNs as baseline. In the second part, we show
the adversarial examples generated from adversarial regions. In the third part, we design a synthetic
case study to show the effectiveness of RGRV.
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5.1 Utility on classification task
Due to the reduction of activation patterns, the expressive ability of SDN is slightly inferior to
typical DNNs with the same architecture. We empirically show the drop of classification accuracy is
acceptable based on two groups of case studies. The first group is the comparison of typical DNNs
and SDNs on MNIST dataset. The details of SDNs are shown as follows.
Table 1: Classification results on MNIST where sat-rate is the frequency of layers which can provide both active
door and inactive door in evaluation
MNIST (16,12) (24,18) (32,24) (40,30)
SDN accuracy(%) 95.08 95.24 95.32 95.45
sat-rate(%) 81.64 85.25 93.49 96.37
DNN accuracy(%) 97.80 98.12 98.21 98.28
1) Each SDN has two hidden layers Layer1 and Layer2; 2) These SDNs have 16, 24, 32, 40 groups
in Layer1, respectively and 12, 18, 24, 30 groups in Layer2, respectively. We name these SDNs as
(16,12), (24,18), (32,24), and (40,30) based on their architecture features; 3) Each group in Layer1
has four neurons, and each group in Layer2 has two neurons. 4) The α in these SDNs are set as 2.
Each baseline DNN has two hidden layers. The number neurons in each layer is the same as
corresponding SDNs. Cross entropy loss and Adam [7] are used to train all the networks 1500 epochs
with batch size 256. The evaluation result is shown in Table 1. Compared with typical DNNs, the
accuracy of SDN only drops 2.72, 2.88, 2.89, 2.83 percent respectively. Besides, the accuracy of
SDN and the sat-rate increase as the numbers of groups in each layer increase.
5.2 Generating adversarial examples
Since our verification method is aimed at global verification, i.e., finding all the adversarial regions in
the input space, the generation of attacks is only a by-product. As this generation is not based on
local or testing way, it is meaningless to compare its efficiency with state-of-the-art attack generation
approaches like [13, 2, 10, 15, 6]. Given parameters(R, r) = (0.04, 0.2), we show the adversarial
examples in SDN (20,20)3 and point out the corresponding adversarial regions.
Figure 6: Adversarial examples
are in the first line and the sam-
ples in second line are classified
correctly
The digits in the first line of Figure 6 classified as “2” are the adver-
sarial examples of the digits below them classified as “0, 6, 8, 4, 9”
respectively. Take 4 as an example, the upper 4 is in “[[18,1],[1,15]]”,
denoting the activation pattern where G118 and G
2
1 are active doors,
G11 and G
2
15 are inactive doors. By inputting “[[18,1],[1,15]]”, we
can find a group of inequations returned by our algorithm, and the
conjunction of these inequations represents the corresponding clas-
sification region of “[[18,1],[1,15]]”. The lower 4 classified as 4 is
in the activation pattern “[[4,10],[1,3]]”. The classification region of
“[[18,1],[1,15]]” is the protruding region found by our method which
is close to “[[4,10],[1,3]]’s” classification region. Moreover, we have
found out that there is only one connected component of class 2 in the input space. Obviously, it is
easy to select a large number of adversarial examples in the adversarial regions.
5.3 Feasibility of precise global verification
As our work is the first global robustness verification work, there is no baseline method existing for
this case study. To draw an exact conclusion whether the results of the proposed method are correct,
we train a SDN on a two-dimensional synthetic dataset shown in Figure 7(a). In Figure 7(a), the big
blue region at the top-right belongs to the first class and the small blue region at the lower-left which
is the “noise” in this dataset belongs to the first class as well. The points in the white region belong
to the second class. The classification results of the trained SDN are visually shown in Figure 7(b)
where the points in the blue regions belong to the first class and the points in the white region belongs
3(20,20) has 20 groups in Layer1 and Layer2 and each group has three neurons. (20,20) is trained on
MNIST images which are resized as 4 × 4. All the other settings are same as the SDNs in subsection 5.1.
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to the second class. Our method has found the adversarial regions in the orange circles. Obviously,
these regions containing adversarial examples are what we do not want. The verification result shows
that this SDN is not globally robust.
6 Conclusion
(a) synthetic dataset (b) classification rules
Figure 7: Synthetic dataset and classification rules
In this paper, we present a novel global verification
framework. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work that provides a complete solution to achiev-
ing global robust verification for neural networks.
Based on the proposed rule-based back-propagation,
we analyze the relationship between activation pat-
terns and classification rules, and thus design a new
network SDN. Together with a region-based global
robustness analysis approach, the verification can be
finished in an acceptable duration, dramatically reduc-
ing computational complexity. Our evaluation shows
that the SDN can perform comparable with classic DNNs, and favourable, the global verification
can be achieved, which is unattainable in the past. We hypothesise that SDN is suitable for safety-
critical fields, especially for some classification tasks which are not very complex but eager for
strict robustness. Developing verification framework for large-scale networks is our further research
direction.
7 Appendix
We assign serial numbers to each activation pattern to store the mapping result in a B+ tree for the
convenience of global verification:
Θ.number =
n−1∑
h
((gh ∗ group_numh + g′h − 1) if (gh < g′h) else (gh ∗ group_numh + g′h))
∗Πnj=h+1|∆′.j|+ (gn ∗ group_numn + g′n)
where n is the number of layers, h represents Layerh, gh(g′h) is the index of Layerh’s ac-
tive(inactive) door, and group_numh is the number of groups in L′h. Two activation patterns
Θ1 and Θ2 satisfy Θ1.number < Θ2.number iff
(∃k∀h(h<k)Θ1.gh = Θ2.gh ∧Θ1.g′h = Θ2.g′h)
∧
{Θ1.gk < Θ2.gk ∨ (Θ1.gk = Θ2.gk ∧Θ1.g′k < Θ2.g′k)}
To prove Theorem 1, we need Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
Lemma 1. Given two vertexes vi and vj(j > i), they are adjacent iff they share a common boundary.
Proof. Given two adjacent vertexes vi and vj(j > i), the corresponding classifications are Si and Sj .
According to the definition of adjacent in Definition 2, there is a x0 satisfies
∃ε>0{[∀x′∈ I(x′ ∈ Si ∨ x′ ∈ Sj)] ∧ (I ∩ Si 6= ∅) ∧ (I ∩ Sj 6= ∅)}
where I = {x′| ||x′ − x0||∞ < ε}.
There must be a x in I on a boundary F which satisfies ∃ε∀Hi 6=HC ∩Hi = ∅ where C = {x′| ||x′ −
x||∞ < ε1}, H and Hi are the point set of boundary F and Fis. Otherwise we can find a series of
points ui(i > 0) and corresponding balls Ii = {x| ||x− ui||∞ < σi} satisfying:
• ui is on the boundary Fi and ∀εiHi+1 ∩ Ii 6= ∅
• ui+1 ∈ Ii, ui+1 on Fi+1, Ii+1 ⊆ Ii and Ii+1 ∩Hi = ∅
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Since we have only finite number of boundaries, here comes the contradiction. Hence we can find
a uk in I on F which is a boundary of both vi and vj and a corresponding Ik satisfies the above
condition. As uk is on the boundary, it satisfies ∀x∈Ik (x ∈ Si∨x ∈ Sj)∧Ik∩Si 6= ∅∧Ik∩Sj 6= ∅]
Thus uk satisfies
∃εk>0[∀H′ 6=Hk Ik ∩H′ = ∅ ∧ ∀x∈Ik (x ∈ Si ∨ x ∈ Sj) ∧ Ik ∩ Si 6= ∅ ∧ Ik ∩ Sj 6= ∅]
and F is a common boundary shared by vi and vj .
The sufficient condition is obvious.
Lemma 2. Given two adjacent vertexes vi and vj(j > i), the shared common boundary of them
comes from the explicit rules of vi.
Proof. The activation pattern Θi and Θj of vi and vj satisfy Θi.number = i > Θj .number = j
thus
∀t(t<k)Θi.gt = Θj .gt ∧Θi.g′t = Θj .g′t
∧
{Θi.gk < Θj .gk ∨ (Θi.gk = Θj .gk ∧Θi.g′k < Θi.g′k)}
This indicates the first change of door happens on L′k. The change of activation pattern leads to the
“mutation” of neurons in L′t(t > k). However the change of neurons in L′t(t ≤ k) is continuous.
According to the proof of Lemma 1, we can find a path in Dα which crosses and only crosses the
F . Thus When the point on this path approaches the boundary, there is at most one inactive neuron
corresponding to F approaches 0 in L′t(t ≤ k). Here we consider where the F comes from:
• F comes from Layert(t > k). The change of sign of x′tl will not influence the activation
pattern in L′k which contradicts to “the first change of door happens on L′k”
• F comes from Layert(t < k). If it changes the activation pattern, it contradicts to “the first
change of door happens on L′k”. Otherwise, there must be another inactive neuron in L′k
changes the sign at the same time which contradicts to “there is at most one inactive neuron
corresponding to F approaches 0 in L′t(t ≤ k)”
• F comes from implicit rules in Layerk. If the activation pattern does not change, here
comes the contradiction to “the first change of door happens on L′k”. If the activation
pattern changes, according to the definition of implicit rules, either the index of active
door gk or inactive door g′k will become smaller, that is to say, the result is a activation
pattern vu(u < i) instead of vj . Thus we have a contradiction
We eventually find out that F comes from explicit rules of vi by a process of elimination.
Based on Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, the correctness of Theorem 1 is obvious.
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